was equipped and despatched from Piræus. The armament assembled at Samos, where it was reinforced by scattered Athenian ships, and by contingents from the allies, to the extent of 40 vessels. The whole fleet of 150 sail then proceeded to the small islands of Arginusæ, near the coast of Asia, and facing Malea, the south-eastern cape of Lesbos. Callicratidas, who went out to meet them, took up his station at the latter point, leaving Eteonicus with 50 ships to maintain the blockade of Mytilené. He had thus only 120 ships to oppose to the 150 of the Athenians, and his pilot, Hermon, advised him to retire before the superior force of the enemy. But Callicratidas replied that he would not disgrace himself by flight, and that if he should perish, Sparta would not feel his loss.

§ 17. The greatest precautions were taken in drawing up the Athenian fleet. The main strength was thrown into the wings, each of which consisted of 60 Athenian ships, divided into four squadrons of 15 each, ranged in a double line. The Peloponnesian fleet, on the contrary, was drawn up in a single extended line; a circumstance displaying great confidence of superiority, and which denoted a vast change in the relative naval skill of the parties; for at the beginning of the war their tactics had been precisely the reverse. It must, however, be borne in mind, that the far greater part of the Athenian fleet was on this occasion manned by hastily raised crews, who had never been to sea before; whilst the Peloponnesian sailors had been well trained by several years' experience.

The battle was long and obstinate. All order was speedily lost, and the ships fought singly with one another. In one of these contests, Callicratidas, who stood on the prow of his vessel ready to board the enemy, was thrown overboard by the shock of the vessels as they met, and perished. At length victory began to declare for the Athenians. The Lacedæmonians, after losing 77 vessels, retreated with the remainder to Chios and Phocæa. The loss of the Athenians was 25 vessels.

Eteonicus was now in jeopardy at Mytilené. When informed of the defeat of his countrymen, he directed the vessel which brought the news to put to sea again, and to return with wreaths and shouts of triumph; whilst, taking advantage of the false impression thus raised in the minds of the Athenians, he hastily got ready for sea, and reached Chios in safety. At the same time the blockading army was withdrawn to Methymna. Conon, thus unexpectedly liberated, put to sea, and the united fleet took up their station at Samos.

§ 18. The battle of Arginusæ led to a deplorable event, which has for ever sullied the pages of Athenian history. At least a

dozen Athenian vessels were left floating about in a disabled condition after the battle; but, owing to a violent storm that ensued, no attempt was made to rescue the survivors, or to collect the bodies of the dead for burial. Eight of the ten generals were summoned home to answer for this conduct; Conon, by his situation at Mytilené, was of course exculpated, and Archestratus had died. Six of the generals obeyed the summons, and were denounced in the Assembly by Theramenes, formerly one of the Four Hundred, for neglect of duty. The generals replied that they had commissioned Theramenes himself and Thrasybulus, each of whom commanded a trireme in the engagement, to undertake the duty, and had assigned 48 ships to them for that purpose. This, however, was denied by Theramenes; and unluckily the generals, from a feeling of kindness towards the latter, had made no mention of the circumstance in their public despatches, but had attributed the abandonment of the foundering vessels solely to the violence of the storm. There are discrepancies in the evidence, and we have no materials for deciding positively which statement was true; but probability inclines to the side of the generals. Public feeling, however, ran very strongly against them, and was increased by an incident which occurred during their trial. After a day's debate the question was adjourned; and in the interval the festival of the Apaturia was celebrated, in which, according to annual custom, the citizens met together according to their families and phratries. Those who had perished at Arginusæ were naturally missed on such an occasion; and the usually cheerful character of the festival was deformed and rendered melancholy by the relatives of the deceased appearing in black clothes and with shaven heads. The passions of the people were violently roused. At the next meeting of the Assembly, Callixenus, a senator, proposed that the people should at once proceed to pass its verdict on the generals, though they had been only partially heard in their defence; and, moreover, that they should all be included in one sentence, though it was contrary to a rule of Attic law, known as the psephisma of Cannonus, to indict citizens otherwise than individually. Callixenus carried his motion in spite of the threat of Euryptolemus to indict him for an illegal proceeding under the Graphé Paranomon. The Prytanes, or senators of the presiding tribe, at first refused to put the question to the Assembly in this illegal way; but their opposition was at length overawed by clamour and violence. There was, however, one honourable exception. The philosopher Socrates, who was one of the Prytanes, refused to withdraw his protest. But his opposition was disregarded, and

the proposal of Callixenus was carried. The generals were condemned, delivered over to the Eleven for execution, and compelled to drink the fatal hemlock. Among them was Pericles, the son of the celebrated statesman. The Athenians afterwards repented of their rash precipitation, and decreed that Callixenus and his accomplices should in their turn be brought to trial; but before the appointed day they managed to escape.

§ 19. After the battle of Arginus the Athenian fleet seems to have remained inactive at Samos during the rest of the year. Through the influence of Cyrus, and the other allies of Sparta, Lysander again obtained the command of the Peloponnesian fleet at the commencement of the year 405 B. C.; though nominally under Aracus as admiral; since it was contrary to Spartan usage that the same man should be twice Navarchus.* His return to power was marked by more vigorous measures. Fresh funds were obtained from Cyrus; the arrears due to the seamen were paid up; and new triremes were put upon the stocks at Antandrus. Oligarchical revolutions were effected in Miletus and other towns. Summoned to visit his sick father in Media, Cyrus even delegated to Lysander the management of his satrapy and revenues during his absence. Lysander was thus placed in possession of power never before realized by any Lacedæmonian commander. But the Athenian fleet under Conon and his coadjutors was still superior in numbers, and Lysander carefully avoided an engagement. He contrived, however, to elude the Athenian fleet, and to cross the Ægean to the coast of Attica, where he had an interview with Agis; and, proceeding thence to the Hellespont, which Conon had left unguarded, he took up his station at Abydos.

§ 20. The Athenians were at this time engaged in ravaging Chios; but when they heard of this movement, and that Lysander had commenced the siege of Lampsacus, they immediately sailed for the Hellespont. They arrived too late to save the town, but they proceeded up the strait and took post at Egospotami, or the "Goat's River;" a place which had nothing to recommend it, except its vicinity to Lampsacus, from which it was separated by a channel somewhat less than two miles broad. It was a mere desolate beach, without houses or inhabitants, so that all the supplies had to be fetched from Sestos, or from the surrounding country, and the seamen were compelled to leave their ships in order to obtain their meals. Under these circumstances the Athenians were very desirous of bringing Lysander to an engagement. But the Spartan commander, who was in a

* Lysander received the title of Epistoleus. See note on p. 360.

strong position, and abundantly furnished with provisions, was in no hurry to run any risks. In vain did the Athenians sail over several days in succession to offer him battle; they always found his ships ready manned, and drawn up in too strong a position to warrant an attack; nor could they by all their manœuvres succeed in enticing him out to combat. This cowardice, as they deemed it, on the part of the Lacedæmonians, begat a corresponding negligence on theirs: discipline was neglected and the men allowed to straggle almost at will. It was in vain that Alcibiades, who since his dismissal resided in a fortress in that neighbourhood, remonstrated with the Athenian generals on the exposed nature of the station they had chosen, and advised them to proceed to Sestos. His counsels were received with taunts and insults. At length on the fifth day, Lysander, having watched an opportunity when the Athenian seamen had gone on shore and were dispersed over the country, rowed swiftly across the strait with all his ships. He found the Athenian fleet, with the exception of 10 or 12 vessels, totally unprepared, and succeeded in capturing nearly the whole of it, without having occasion to strike a single blow. Of the 180 ships which composed the fleet, only the trireme of Conon himself, the Paralus, and 8 or 10 other vessels succeeded in escaping. Conon was afraid to return to Athens after so signal a disaster, and took refuge with Evagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus. All the Athenian prisoners, amounting to 3000 or 4000, together with the generals, were put to death by order of Lysander, in retaliation for the cruelty with which the Athenians had treated the prisoners they had lately made.

By this momentous victory, which was suspected to have been achieved through the corrupt connivance of some of the Athenian generals, the contest on the Hellespont, and virtually the Peloponnesian war, was brought to an end. The closing scene of the catastrophe was enacted at Athens itself; but the fate of the imperial city must be reserved for another chapter.

FROM THE BATTLE OF EGOSPOTAMI TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY

§ 1. Alarm at Athens. § 2. Proceedings of Lysander. Capture of the Athenian dependencies. § 3. Measures of the Athenians, Athens invested. § 4. Embassy of Theramenes. Conditions of capitulation. § 5. Lysander takes possession of Athens. Destruction of the long walls, &c. § 6. Return of the oligarchical exiles. Establishment of the Thirty. § 7. Surrender of Samos and triumph of Lysander. § 8. Proceedings of the Thirty at Athens. § 9. Opposition of Theramenes. § 10. Proscriptions. Death of Theramenes. § 11. Suppression of intellectual culture. Socrates. § 12. Death of Alcibiades. § 13. Jealousy of the Grecian states towards Sparta and Lysander. § 14. Thrasybulus at Phylé. § 15. Seizure and massacre of the Eleusinians. § 16. Thrasybulus occupies Piræus. Death of Critias. § 17. Deposition of the Thirty, and establishment of the Ten. Return of Lysander to Athens, and arrival of Pausanias. § 18. Peace with Thrasybulus, and evacuation of Attica by the Peloponnesians. § 19. Restoration of the democracy. § 20. Archonship of Euclides. Reduction of Eleusis.

§ 1. THE defeat of Egospotami, which took place about September, 405 B.C., was announced at Piræus in the night, by the