provisions enough to sustain life. The numerous bodies of those who died were left to putrify where they had fallen, till at length the place became such an intolerable centre of stench and infection that, at the end of seventy days, the Syracusans, for their own comfort and safety, were obliged to remove the survivors. All but the Athenians and the Italian and Sicilian Greeks were sold into slavery. What became of the Athenians we are not informed, but they were probably employed as slaves by the richer Syracusans, since the story runs that many succeeded in winning the affection and pity of their masters by reciting portions of the dramas of Euripides. Nicias and Demosthenes were condemned to death in spite of all the efforts of Gylippus and Hermocrates to save them. The latter contrived to spare them the humiliation of a public execution by providing them with the means of committing suicide.

§ 18. Such was the end of two of the largest and best appointed armaments that had ever gone forth from Athens. Nicias, as we have seen, was from the first opposed to the expedition in which they were employed, as pregnant with the most dangerous consequences to Athens; and, though it must be admitted that in this respect his views were sound, it cannot at the same time be concealed that his own want of energy, and his incompetence as a general, were the chief causes of the failure of the undertaking. Possessing much fortitude but little enterprise, respectable in private life, punctual in the performance of his religious duties, not deficient in a certain kind of political wisdom, which, however, derived its colour rather from timidity and over-caution than from that happy mixture of boldness and prudence which characterises the true statesman, Nicias had by these qualities obtained far more than his just share of political reputation and influence, and had thus been named to the command of an expedition for which he was qualified neither by military skill nor by that enthusiasm and confidence of success which it so peculiarly demanded. His mistakes involved the fall of Demosthenes, an officer of far greater resolution and ability than himself, and who, had his counsels been followed, would in all probability have conducted the enterprise to a safe termination, though there was no longer room to hope for success. The career of Demosthenes marks him as one of the first generals of the age, but unfortunately he held only a subordinate rank in Sicily. The Athenians became sensible when too late of the difference between the two commanders. On the pillar erected to the memory of the warriors who fell in Sicily the name of Demosthenes found a place, whilst that of Nicias was omitted.

FROM THE END OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

§ 1. Consternation and hardships at Athens. § 2. Measures for defence. § 3. Revolt of Chios, Erythræ, and Clazomena. § 4. Spread of the revolt. Defection of Teos, Lesbos, and Miletus. Revolution at Samos, which becomes the head-quarters of the Athenian fleet. § 5. Recovery of Lesbos by the Athenians. Dissatisfaction of the Lacedæmonians with Tissaphernes. § 6. Schemes of Alcibiades. § 7. He proposes a league between the Athenians and Persians, and the establishment of an oligarchy at Athens. § 8. Agitation for an oligarchy at Athens. § 9. Conference of Pisander with Alcibiades. Artifices of the latter. Fresh treaty between Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians. § 10. Progress of the oligarchical conspiracy at Athens and Samos. § 11. Establishment of the Four Hundred. § 12. Their proceedings. § 13. Proceedings at Samos. Alcibiades joins the democracy there. § 14. The Athenian envoys at Samos. § 15. Dissensions among the Four Hundred. They negotiate with Sparta. § 16. Counter revolution at Athens. Defeat of the Athenian fleet and capture of Eubœa by the Lacedæmonians. § 17. The Four Hundred deposed and democracy re-established at Athens.

§ 1. THE first intelligence of the destruction of the Sicilian armament is said to have been communicated by a stranger, in a barber's shop in the Piræus. Big with the eventful news, the unfortunate barber hastened up to Athens to communicate it to the archons and the public; but he was treated as a tale-bearer and impostor; and being unable to corroborate his story, in consequence of the disappearance of his informant, he was put to the torture. The tidings were, however, soon confirmed by the arrival of fugitives who had managed to escape from the

disastrous scene. Athens was now filled with affliction and dismay. To private grief for the loss of friends was added despair of the public safety. There seemed to be no means of preventing the city from falling into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. The popular fury vented itself in abusing the orators who had recommended the expedition, and the soothsayers who had foretold its success.

The affairs of the Athenians wore indeed a most threatening aspect. The Lacedæmonian post at Decelea was a constant source of annoyance. No part of Attica escaped the forays which were made from thence. All the cattle were destroyed, and the most valuable slaves began to desert in great numbers to the enemy. Athens was almost in a state of siege. The fatigue of guarding the large extent of wall became very onerous on the reduced number of citizens. The knights or horsemen were on constant duty in order to repress the enemy's marauders; but their horses were soon lamed and rendered inefficient by the hard and stony nature of the soil. But what chiefly excited the despondency of the Athenians was the visible decline of their naval superiority. An engagement with the Corinthian fleet near Naupactus, in the summer of 413 B.C., had ended with neither side gaining the advantage, though the forces were nearly equal; but to the Athenians the moral effects were equivalent to a defeat.

§ 2. Yet that cheerfulness and energy under misfortune which form such striking and excellent traits in the character of the Athenians, did not long desert them. After the first movements of rage and despair, they began to contemplate their condition more calmly, and to take the necessary measures for defence. A board of elders was appointed, under the name of Probuli,* to watch over the public safety. The splendour of the public ceremonies was curtailed in order to raise funds for the necessities of the state; the garrison recently established on the coast of Laconia was recalled; the building of a new fleet was commenced; and Cape Sunium was fortified in order to ensure an uninterrupted communication between Piræus and Eubœa, from which island the Athenians principally drew their pro

visions.

§ 3. Whilst the imperial city was thus driven to consult for her very existence, it seemed a chimerical hope that she could retain her widely scattered dependencies. Her situation inspired her enemies with new vigour; states hitherto neutral declared against her; her subject-allies prepared to throw off the

* Πρόβουλοι.

yoke; even the Persian satraps and the court of Susa bestirred themselves against her. The first blow to the Athenian empire was struck by the wealthy and populous island of Chios. This again was the work of Alcibiades, the implacable enemy of his native land. In the winter following the overthrow of the Athenian armament in Sicily, several of the most powerful allies of Athens, among whom were the Eubeans, Chians, and Lesbians, had solicited Sparta to assist them in throwing off the Athenian yoke. At the same time envoys appeared at Sparta from Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap of Ionia, Caria, and the adjacent coasts, and from Pharnabazus, whose satrapy extended from the Euxine to the gulf of Elæa, inviting the Lacedæmonians to cooperate with them in destroying the Athenian empire in Asia, and promising to provide the necessary funds.

By the advice of Alcibiades, the Lacedæmonians resolved that the Chians should have the preference, and that a fleet should be sent to their assistance. Impatient of delay, Alcibiades shortly afterwards crossed over to Chios with a Lacedæmonian squadron of five ships, under the command of Chalcideus. The oligarchical party at Chios had matured all their plans for the revolt, and the arrival of Alcibiades caused them to be put into execution. The people were taken by surprise, and were reluctantly induced to renounce their alliance with Athens. Their example was almost immediately followed by Erythræ and Cla

zomenæ.

Teos,

§ 4. The reserve of 1000 talents, set apart by Pericles to meet the contingency of an actual invasion, still remained untouched; but now by a unanimous vote the penalty of death, which forbad its appropriation to any other purpose, was abolished, and the fund applied in fitting out a fleet against Chios. Meantime, Alcibiades was indefatigable in fanning the flames of revolt, which now spread rapidly through the Athenian allies. Lesbos, and Miletus proclaimed their independence of Athens. At Miletus, Chalcideus, on the part of Sparta, concluded an infamous treaty with Tissaphernes, stipulating that the Greek cities and territory formerly belonging to Persia should be restored to her; that the Athenians should not be permitted to derive any revenue from them; and that Persia and the Lacedæmonians should jointly carry on the war against Athens. To conclude the bargain, Miletus was handed over to Tissaphernes.

Samos still remained faithful to the Athenians, and amidst the general defection of their Asiatic allies had become of the last importance to them. This island, like Chios, was governed by an oligarchy; but warned by the revolution in that island, the Samiaus rose against the oligarchs, slew 200 of them, and

banished 400 more.

The Athenians at once recognized the newly established democracy, and secured the adhesion of the Samians by putting them on the footing of equal and independent allies. Samos became the head-quarters of the Athenian fleet, and the base of their operations during the remainder of the

war.

§ 5. The tide of success at length began to turn in favour of the Athenians. They had succeeded in collecting a considerable fleet at Samos, with which they recovered Lesbos and Clazomenæ, defeated the Chians, and laid waste their territory. They also gained a victory over the Peloponnesians at Miletus, but this powerful city still remained in the hands of Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians.

Towards the close of the year, Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian commander, received large reinforcements from Peloponnesus, and was now at the head of so imposing an armament that he was enabled to modify the former treaty with Tissaphernes, of which the Lacedæmonians were heartily ashamed. The new treaty, however, differed from the previous one rather in terms than substance, and appears to have been far from giving satisfaction at Sparta. The conduct of Tissaphernes afforded another reason for discontent. He had given notice that he could no longer continue the high rate of payment of a drachma per day for the seamen's wages, the sum agreed upon in the first treaty, without express instructions from the court of Susa; and though he had reduced that sum by one half, it was very irregularly paid; whilst his whole behaviour displayed a great want of hearty co-operation with the Lacedæmonians. Another Peloponnesian squadron was therefore despatched to the coast of Asia, having on board Lichas and ten other Spartans, for the purpose of remonstrating with Tissaphernes and opening fresh negotiations. Having obtained an interview with Tissaphernes at Cnidus, Lichas took exceptions to the two former treaties; of which the first expressly, the second by implication, recognized the claims of Persia not only to the islands of the Egean, but even to Thessaly and Boeotia. Lichas, therefore, proposed a new treaty; but Tissaphernes was so indignant at the proposition that he immediately broke off the negotiation.

§ 6. The conduct of Tissaphernes towards the Lacedæmonians was the result of the counsels of Alcibiades, who was scheming to effect his return to Athens by means of his intrigues with the Persian satrap. In the course of a few months Alcibiades had completely forfeited the confidence of the Lacedæmonians. His ultra-Athenian temperament and manners must have been as unwelcome to them as their own slowness