with the main body in the centre of the island. An outpost of 30 hoplites defended the extremity farthest from Pylus. The end of the island facing that place, steep and rugged by nature, was rendered still stronger by a circuit of rude stones, of ancient and unknown origin, which answered the purpose of a fort. The Athenians, having landed before daybreak, surprised and cut to pieces the advanced guard of 30 hoplites. Then Demosthenes, having divided his light-armed troops into bodies of about 200 men each, which were to hover round and annoy the enemy, drew up his 800 hoplites in battle array near the spot where he had landed. Epitadas had therefore to advance against him with his main body, about 360 in number, over ground obstructed by the ashes and stumps of the burnt wood, and amidst a shower of missiles from the light troops on his flanks and rear. At length, distressed by a species of warfare which he had no means of repelling, and almost blinded by the dust and ashes, Epitadas ordered his men to retreat to the stone fort at the extremity of the island, whither they were followed by the Athenian hoplites. Here, however, having the advantage of the ground, and being able to use their spears and swords in close combat, the Lacedæmonians for a long while kept their assailants at bay; till some Messenians, stealing round by the sea-shore, over crags and cliffs which the Lacedæmonians had deemed impracticable, suddenly appeared on the high ground which overhung their rear. They now began to give way, and would soon have been all slain; but Cleon and Demosthenes, being anxious to carry them prisoners to Athens, called off their men from the pursuit, and sent a herald to summon the Lacedæmonians to surrender. The latter, in token of compliance, dropped their shields, and waved their hands above their heads. They requested, however, permission to communicate with their countrymen on the mainland; who, after two or three communications, sent them a final message-" to take counsel for themselves, but to do nothing disgraceful." The survivors then surrendered. They were 292 in number, 120 of whom were native Spartans belonging to the first families. By this surrender the prestige of the Spartan arms was in a great degree destroyed. The Spartans were not, indeed, deemed invincible; but their previous feats, especially at Thermopylæ, had inspired the notion that they would rather die than yield; an opinion which could now no longer be entertained.

§ 9. Cleon had thus performed his promise. On the day after the victory, he and Demosthenes started with the prisoners for Athens, where they arrived within 20 days from the time of Cleon's departure. Altogether, this affair was one of the most

favourable for the Athenians that had occurred during the war. The prisoners would serve not only for a guarantee against future invasions, which might be averted by threatening to put them to death, but also as a means for extorting advantageous conditions whenever a peace should be concluded. Nay, the victory itself was of considerable importance, since it enabled the Athenians to place Pylus in a better posture of defence, and, by garrisoning it with Messenians from Naupactus, to create a stronghold whence Laconia might be overrun and ravaged at pleasure. The Lacedæmonians themselves were so sensible of these things, that they sent repeated messages to Athens to propose a peace, but which the Athenians altogether disregarded.

§ 10. Meanwhile, after the victory at Sphacteria, Eurymedon and Sophocles proceeded with the Athenian fleet to Corcyra, where, in conjunction with the people, they took by storm the post of the oligarchs on Mount Istoné. The latter at first retired to an inaccessible peak, but subsequently surrendered themselves on condition of being sent to Athens to be judged by the Athenian assembly. Eurymedon, the same man, it will be observed, who had before abandoned the Corcyræans to all the fury of civil discord, assented to these conditions, and caused the prisoners to be secured in the small adjoining island of Ptychia But he took not the slightest pains to carry out the agreement; nay, he even connived at the artifices of the Corcyræan democracy to entrap the prisoners into a breach of the capitulation, and thus procure a pretext for their destruction. For this purpose emissaries in the guise of friends were sent over to Ptychia to persuade the prisoners that Eurymedon intended to hand them over to their enemies, and thus succeeded in inducing some of them to escape in a boat provided for that purpose. The boat was seized in the act, and Eurymedon now delivered up the prisoners to the democratical party. They were at first confined in a large building, whence, chained two and two together, they were led out to execution in companies of twenty. They advanced through a road lined with armed men, who singled out their private enemies, and struck and wounded them till they perished. "These scenes," says a great historian, are real prototypes of the September massacres at Paris: all the prisoners, just as at Paris, were led from the prison between two rows of armed men, and cut to pieces."* What, however, renders this scene still more disgusting than the Parisian massacres, is, that a third party-Eurymedon, with his Athenians-looked on in cold blood, and saw these atrocities

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perpetrated without making the slightest attempt to prevent them. After three companies had been destroyed the remaining prisoners refused to quit the building, or to allow any one to enter it; at the same time piteously imploring the Athenians to kill them, rather than abandon them to the cruelties of their countrymen. But Eurymedon was inexorable. The people now unroofed part of the building, and assailed the prisoners with showers of tiles and arrows, till, in order to escape this lingering fate, they were driven to commit suicide. The work of death proceeded through the night. At daybreak the people entered the building with carts, and piling upon them the dead bodies, in number about 300, carried them out of the city.

§ 11 The eighth year of the war (B. C. 424) opened with brilliant prospects for the Athenians. But their good fortune had now reached its culminating point; and before the year closed, their defeat at the battle of Delium and the loss of their empire in Thrace more than counterbalanced all the advantages they had previously gained. At first, however, success still attended their arms. Nicias reduced the important island of Cythera, at the southern extremity of Laconia, and placed garrisons in the towns of Cythera and Scandeia. He then proceeded to the coasts of Laconia, which he ravaged in various places. Among his conquests here was the town of Thyrea, where the Lacedæmonians had allowed the Æginetans to settle after their expulsion from their own island. Thyrea was destroyed, and the surviving Æginetans carried to Athens and put to death. Among the horrors which the great historian of the Peloponnesian war has noted as characterizing the times, the murder of 2000 Helots by the Lacedæmonians stands conspicuous. Alarmed for their own safety since the establishment of an Athenian and Messenian force at Pylus, the Lacedæmonians about this time proclaimed that those Helots who had distinguished themselves by their services during the war should come forward and claim their liberty. A large body appeared, out of whom 2000 were selected as worthy of emancipation. Crowned with garlands, and honoured with all the imposing ceremonies of religion, the unhappy Helots paid with their lives for the liberty thus solemnly acquired. In a short time they all disappeared, no man knew how, by secret orders from the Ephors, who took this perfidious and detestable method to rid themselves of formidable enemies.

§ 12. Elate with their continued good fortune, the Athenians aimed at nothing less than the recovery of all the possessions which they had held before the Thirty Years' truce. For this purpose they planned two important expeditions, one against

Megara and the other against Bootia. In the former they were partially successful. They seized Nisæa, the port of Megara, which they permanently occupied with an Athenian garrison; but they were prevented from obtaining possession of Megara itself by the energy of Brasidas, who was at that time in the neighbourhood of Corinth, collecting troops for his Thracian expedition. Receiving intelligence of the danger of Megara, he immediately marched to the assistance of the city with a considerable force, which the Athenians did not venture to attack.

The expedition against Boeotia was attended with the most disastrous results. Some Baotian exiles, and other malcontent citizens, had formed a plan to betray Sipha, on the gulf of Corinth, and Charonea, on the borders of Phocis, into the hands of the Athenians, who were on the same day to invade Bootia from the south, and to seize the temple of Apollo at Delium, a place about five miles from Tanagra, strongly situated upon the cliffs on the eastern coast. It was anticipated that these simultaneous attacks at various points would divide the Baotian forces, and render the enterprise easy of execution. But the scheme was betrayed, and miscarried. Demosthenes, who was to attack Siphæ and Charonea, found those places preoccupied by a formidable Boeotian force, which rendered vain all hopes of surprising them. Hippocrates, who commanded the army of invasion from the south, proceeded to execute his part in the arrangement, and marched to Delium with the very large force of 7000 Athenian hoplites, together with 25,000 light armed troops and several hundred cavalry. A day's march brought him to Delium, where he immediately fortified the sanctuary of Apollo with a rampart and ditch, besides other works. When these were completed, a garrison was left in the place, and the army commenced its homeward march. On arriving at the heights between Delium and the plain of Oropus, they were encountered by the Baotians, who had assembled in great force at Tanagra. Their army consisted of about 7000 Baotian hoplites, some of whom were the very flower of the Theban warriors, 10,000 light armed troops, 500 peltasts, and 1000 horse. They were led by the eleven Bootarchs then at the head of the Baotian confederacy, though the supreme command seems to have been vested, probably alternately, in the two Bootarchs of Thebes, Pagondas and Aranthides. All the Bootarchs, with the exception of Pagondas, were of opinion that, as the Athenians seemed to be in full retreat, they should be suffered to retire unmolested. But that commander, disregarding the opinion of his colleagues, appealed to the patriotic and religious. feelings of the soldiers. He painted in strong colours the danger of suffering this insult to their territory to pass unpunished, and

pointed out that the sacrifices were favourable for an attack, whilst, on the other hand, the Athenians had incurred the anger of Apollo by violating his temple. Having by these representations persuaded the Boeotians to hazard an engagement, he drew up the army in order of battle under the brow of a hill which concealed them from the Athenians. Hippocrates, on his side, hastened to prepare his troops for the battle. His hoplites were drawn up in a line of eight deep, having the light armed troops and cavalry on the flanks. The heavy Boeotian phalanx, on the contrary, was twenty-five deep; the Theban hoplites occupying the right, with the other heavy-armed Bootians on the left and in the centre. The light-armed troops and cavalry were ranged, as in the Athenian line, upon the flanks. The Boeotians, ascending the hill in this array, as soon as they came in sight of the Athenians, raised the war-shout and charged, before Hippocrates had finished addressing his men. Ravines at both extremities of the line prevented the light troops from engaging; but the serried ranks of the hoplites met in desperate conflict. The left wing of the Bœotians was repulsed; but on the right the skill and valour of the chosen Theban warriors who led the van, as well as the superior weight of the deep and densely compacted phalanx, bore down all resistance. At the same time Pagondas, having sent round his cavalry to attack the Athenian right, restored the fortune of the day on that side also. The rout of the Athenians was now complete. Some fled back to Delium, some to Oropus, others to the heights of Parnes. Hippocrates himself fell in the engagement, together with 1000 hoplites; a loss about double that of the Baotians. Fortunately for the Athenians, the battle had commenced late in the day, and they were thus rescued by the friendly shades of night from the pursuit and massacre which would otherwise have overtaken them.

When on the morrow an Athenian herald asked the customary permission to bury the slain, the Baotians reproached the Athenians with the violation of Apollo's sanctuary, and refused the sacred rites of sepulture till the sacrilege should be expiated, and Delium evacuated. They immediately invested that place, which surrendered after a siege of seventeen days. The greater part of the garrison, however, succeeded in escaping by sea, but about 200 prisoners fell into the hands of the Boeotians. Altogether the battle of Delium was the greatest and most decisive fought during the first period of the war. An interesting feature of the battle is that both Socrates and his pupil Alcibiades were engaged in it, the former among the hoplites, the latter in the cavalry. Socrates distinguished himself by his bravery, and was one of those who, instead of throw