pique. Aristophanes was on the aristocratic side in politics, and was moreover engaged in a private quarrel with Cleon, caused by the latter having complained to the senate of his comedy of the Babylonians. Thucydides, indeed, in his account of Cleon, goes very far to confirm the description of Aristophanes. But here too we must be somewhat on our guard respecting the testimony of an historian otherwise remarkable for his impartiality; for it was to Cleon that Thucydides owed his banishment. Still, after making all due allowance for the operation of these causes, we cannot refrain from thinking that the character of Cleon conveyed to us by these two writers is, in its main features, correct. Even a caricature must have some grounds of truth for its basis; nor would Aristophanes, out of mere regard for his poetical reputation, have ventured to produce before an Athenian audience a character of their well-known demagogue so unlike the truth as not to be easily recognised. The actions of Cleon, which are undisputed, show him cruel and cowardly; characteristics which may lead us to infer any degree of baseness in a man. Along with his impudence and other bad qualities he must however no doubt have possessed a certain share of ability, since, at the period of which we are now speaking, he possessed more influence than any other orator in the Athenian assembly. It was he who took the lead in the debate respecting the disposal of the Mytileneans, and made the savage and horrible proposal to put to death not only the prisoners who had been sent to Athens, but the whole male population of Mytilené of military age-including therefore those who had not participated in, or were even opposed to, the revolt-and to sell the women and children into slavery. This motion he succeeded in carrying, notwithstanding the opposition of Diodotus and others; and in order seemingly that no room might be left for cooler reflection, a trireme was immediately despatched to Mytilené, conveying orders to Paches to put the bloody decree into execution.

§ 6. The barbarous laws of ancient warfare justified atrocities which in modern times would be regarded with horror and detestation; and we have already described the Lacedæmonians as exercising those laws with the most revolting severity in the case of the garrison of Platæa ;-an event, however, which took. place a little after the time of which we are now speaking. The conduct of the Lacedæmonians on that occasion admits of no excuse. But this decree of the Athenians was infinitely worse, not only on account of the much greater number of persons whom it devoted to death, but also and principally because it made no discrimination between the innocent and the guilty. One

night's reflection convinced the better part of the Athenians of the enormity which they had sanctioned. Ordinary experience shows that bodies of men will perpetrate acts which the individuals composing them would shrink from with horror: and this tendency was one of the worst evils springing from the multitudinous and purely democratical composition of the Athenian assemblies. On the morrow so general a feeling prevailed of the horrible injustice that had been committed, that the Strategi acceded to the prayer of the Mytilenean envoys and called a fresh assembly; though by so doing they committed an illegal act and exposed themselves to impeachment.

§ 7. Cleon, however, had not changed his opinion. In the second assembly he repeated his arguments against the Mytileneans, and clamoured for what he called "justice" against them. He denounced the folly and mischief of reversing on one day what had been done on the preceding; and, though himself the very type and model of a demagogue, had the impudence to characterize his opponents as guilty and ambitious orators, who sacrificed the good of the republic either to their interests or their vanity! His opponent, Diodotus, very wisely abstained from appealing to the humanity of an assembly which had passed the decree of the previous day. He confined himself entirely to the policy of the question, and concluded by recommending that the Mytileneans already in custody should be put upon their trial, but that the remainder of the population should be spared. This amendment having been carried by a small majority, a second trireme was immediately despatched to Mytilené, with orders to Paches to arrest the execution. The utmost diligence was needful. The former trireme had a start of four and twenty hours, and nothing but exertions almost superhuman would enable the second to reach Mytilené early enough to avert the tragical catastrophe. The oarsmen were allowed by turns only short intervals of rest, and took their food, consisting of barleymeal steeped in wine and oil, as they sat at the oar. Happily the weather proved favourable; and the crew, who had been promised large rewards in case they arrived in time, exerted themselves to deliver the reprieve, whilst the crew of the preceding vessel had conveyed the order for execution with slowness and reluctance. Yet even so the countermand came only just in time. The mandate was already in the hands of Paches, who was taking measures for its execution. With regard to the prisoners at Athens, the motion of Cleon to put them to death was carried, and they were slain to the number of more than a thousand. The fortifications of Mytilené were razed, and her fleet delivered up to the Athenians. The whole island, with the ex

ception of Methymna, which had remained faithful, was divided into 3000 lots, 300 of which were set apart for the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian cleruchs.

The fate of Paches, the Athenian commander at Mytilené, must not be passed over in silence. On his return to Athens, he was arraigned before the dicastery for the dishonour of two Mytilenean women, whose husbands he had slain; and such was the feeling of indignation excited by this case among the susceptible Athenians, that Paches, without waiting for his sentence, killed himself with his sword in open court.

§ 8. The fate of the Platæans and Mytileneans affords a fearful illustration of the manners of the age; but these horrors soon found a parallel in Corcyra. It has been already related that, after the sea-fight off that island, the Corinthians carried home many of the principal Corcyræans as prisoners. These men were treated with the greatest indulgence; and while Mytilené was under blockade, were sent back to Corcyra, nominally under the heavy ransom of 800 talents, but in reality with the view of withdrawing the island from the Athenian alliance. Being joined by the rest of the oligarchical citizens on their return, they assassinated the leaders of the democratical party in the senate-house, and then carried a resolution in the assembly of the people, that the Corcyræans should for the future observe a strict neutrality between the contending parties. But they did not stop here. They determined on putting down the democratical party by force, and with this view seized the principal harbour, together with the arsenal and market-place. The people, however, got possession of the higher parts of the town, together with the Acropolis; and having been reinforced by slaves from the interior, whom they promised to emancipate, they renewed the combat on the following day. The oligarchs, driven to extremity, adopted the desperate expedient of setting fire to the town, and thus destroyed a great deal of property near the docks; but an adverse wind fortunately prevented it from extending to the remainder of the city.

The Athenians had been informed of the state of things at Corcyra, and at this juncture an Athenian squadron of twelve triremes, under the command of Nicostratus, arrived from Naupactus. Nicostratus behaved with great moderation, and did his best to restore peace between the parties. He had apparently succeeded in this object, when the position of affairs was suddenly changed by the arrival of a Peloponnesian fleet of 53 galleys under the command of Alcidas. Nicostratus succeeded, by skilful manœuvres, in keeping the enemy at bay with his small fleet, but was obliged at last to retreat, which he did in good

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order, and without losing any of his vessels. Alcidas, however, with his usual slowness, neglected to make use of the opportunity, and attack the capital at once, though Brasidas strongly advised him to do so. He lost a day in ravaging the country, and in the following night fire-signals upon the island of Leucas telegraphed the approach of an Athenian fleet of 60 triremes under Eurymedon. Alcidas now only thought of making his escape, which he effected before daybreak, leaving the Corcyræan oligarchs to their fate.

Another vicissitude thus rendered the popular party in Corcyra again triumphant. The vengeance which they took on their opponents was fearful. The most sacred sanctuaries afforded no protection; the nearest ties of blood and kindred were sacrificed to civil hatred. In one case a father slew even his own son. These scenes of horror lasted for seven days, during which death in every conceivable form was busily at work. Yet the Athenian admiral did not once interpose to put a stop to these atrocities. About 500 of the oligarchical party, however, effected their escape, and fortified themselves on Mount Istoné, not far from the capital.

§ 9. Thucydides, in drawing this bloody picture of domestic dissensions, traces the causes of it to the war. In peace and prosperity, when men are not overmastered by an irresistible necessity, the feelings both of states and individuals are mild and humane. But a war under the auspices of Sparta and Athens— one the representative of the aristocratic, the other of the democratic, principle-became a war of opinion, and embittered the feelings of political parties, by offering to each the means and opportunity of enforcing its views through an alliance with one or the other of the two leading cities. The example of Corcyra was soon followed in other Hellenic states. Not only were the dispositions of men altered by these causes, but even the very names of things were changed. Daring rashness was honoured with the name of bravery, whilst considerate delay was denounced as the mere pretext of timidity. Wisdom was regarded as equivalent to cowardice, and the weighing of everything as a pretence for attempting nothing. The simplicity which generally characterises virtue was ridiculed as dulness and stupidity; whilst he was regarded as the cleverest who excelled in cunning and treachery, and especially if he employed his arts to the destruction of his nearest, and therefore unsuspecting, friends and relatives.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR CONTINUED.-FROM THE SEDITION AT CORCYRA TO THE PEACE OF NICIAS.

§ 1. Sixth year of the war. Return of the plague. Purification of Delos. § 2. Seventh year. Fortification of Pylus. § 3. Attempts of the Lacedæmonians to recover Pylus. § 4. Arrival and victory of the Athenian fleet. Blockade of Sphacteria. § 5. The Lacedæmonians sue for peace at Athens. Extravagant demands of Cleon. § 6. Renewal of hostilities. § 7. Debates in the Assembly. Cleon elected general. § 8. Capture of Sphacteria. § 9. Advantages of the victory. § 10. Proceedings at Corcyra. Slaughter of the oligarchs. § 11. Eighth year of the war. Capture of Cythera. § 12. Invasion of the Megarid and Boeotia by the Athenians. Capture of Nisæa, the port of Megara. Defeat of the Athenians at the battle of Delium. 13. Brasidas in Thrace. Takes Amphipolis. Banishment of Thucydides. § 14. Ninth year of the war. A truce between Sparta and Athens. The war continued in Thrace. § 15. Tenth year of the war. Cleon proceeds to Amphipolis. His defeat and death. Death of Brasidas. § 16. Eleventh year of the war. Fifty years' peace between Athens and Sparta.

§ 1. THE beginning of the sixth year of the war (B. C. 426) was marked by natural calamities which seemed to present a counterpart to the moral disturbances which were agitating Greece. Floods and earthquakes of unusual violence and frequency occurred in various parts; and the Lacedæmonians, alarmed at these portents, abstained from their intended invasion of Attica. The military operations of the Athenians were unimportant.