§ 1. Expedition of Mardonius into Greece. § 2. Preparations of Darius for a second invasion of Greece. Heralds sent to the leading Grecian states to demand earth and water. § 3. Invasion of Greece by the Persians under Datis and Artaphernes. Conquest of the Cyclades and Eretria. § 4. Preparations at Athens to resist the Persians. History of Miltiades. § 5. Debate among the ten Athenian Generals. Resolution to give battle to the Persians. 6. Battle of Marathon. § 7. Movements of the Persians after the battle. § 8. Effect of the battle of Marathon upon the Athenians. § 9. Glory of Miltiades. § 10. His unsuccessful expedition to Paros. § 11. His trial, condemnation, and death. § 12. History of Egina. § 13. War between Athens and Egina. § 14. Athens becomes a maritime power. § 15. Rivalry of Themistocles and Aristides. Ostracism of the latter. § 1. DARIUS had not forgotten his vow to take vengeance upon Athens. Shortly after the suppression of the Ionic revolt, he appointed Mardonius to succeed Artaphernes in the government of the Persian provinces bordering upon the Egean. Mardonius was a Persian noble of high rank, who had lately married the king's daughter, and was distinguished by a love of glory. Darius placed at his command a large armament, with injunctions to bring to Susa those Athenians and Eretrians who had insulted the authority of the Great King. Mardonius lost no time in crossing the Hellespont, and commenced his march through Thrace and Macedonia, subduing, as he went along, the tribes which had not yet submitted to the Persian power. Meanwhile he ordered the fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and join the land forces at the head of the Gulf of Therma. But one of the hurricanes, which frequently blow off this dangerous coast, overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed three hundred vessels, and drowned or dashed upon the rocks twenty thousand men. Mardonius himself was not much more fortunate. In his passage through Macedonia, he was attacked at night by the Brygians, an independent Thracian tribe, who slaughtered a great portion of his army. He remained in the country long enough to reduce this people to submission; but his forces were so weakened, that he could not proceed farther. He led his army back across the Hellespont, and returned to the Persian court, covered with shame and grief. Thus ended the first expedition of the Persians against the Grecian states in Europe (B.c. 492). § 2. The failure of this expedition did not shake the resolution of Darius. On the contrary, it only made him the more anxious for the conquest of Greece; and Hippias was constantly near him to keep alive his resentment against Athens. He began to make preparations for another attempt on a still larger scale, and meantime sent heralds to most of the Grecian states to demand from each earth and water as the symbol of submission. This he probably did in order to ascertain the amount of resistance he was likely to experience. Such terror had the Persians inspired by their recent conquest of Ionia, that a large number of the Grecian cities at once complied with the demand. But at Athens and at Sparta the heralds met with a very different reception. So indignant were the citizens of these states at the insolent demand, that the Athenians cast the herald into a deep pit, and the Spartans threw him into a well, bidding him take earth and water from thence. § 3. Among the states which had yielded submission to the envoy of Darius, was the island of Ægina, then the first maritime power in Greece. It was, however, as much hatred of the Athenians, as fear of the Persian monarch, which had led the Æginetans to take this step. They had been at war for some years past with the Athenians, and were now ready to avail themselves of the Persian power for the purpose of crushing their obnoxious rival. The Athenians, on the other hand, sent ambassadors to Sparta, accusing the Æginetans of having betrayed the common cause of Greece by giving earth and water to the barbarians, and calling upon Sparta, as the leading state of Hellas, to punish the offenders. This proceeding deserves particular notice. It is the first time in Grecian history that the Greeks are represented as having a common political cause, and recognizing the leadership of one state. The imminent danger to which they were exposed from the Persians brought about this union, and led them to recognize the supremacy of Sparta, a position which this state continued to enjoy from this time forth till the end of the Persian war. The complaints of the Athenians met with immediate attention at Sparta. Cleomenes, one of the Spartan kings, forthwith crossed over to Ægina, and was proceeding to arrest and carry away some of the leading citizens, when Demaratus, the other king, privately encouraged the Æginetans to defy the authority of his colleague. Thus baffled in his object, Cleomenes returned to Sparta, vowing vengeance against Demaratus. It appears that there had always been some doubts respecting the legitimacy of the latter. Of these suspicions Cleomenes now resolved to avail himself, and instigated Leotychides, the next heir to the crown, to attack publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus. The question was referred to the Delphic oracle; and through the influence of Cleomenes, the priestess declared that his colleague was illegitimate. Leotychides thus succeeded to the throne, and Demaratus descended into a private station. Shortly afterwards Demaratus received a gross affront from the new king at a public festival; whereupon he quitted Sparta in wrath, and crossed over to Darius, who received him graciously, and loaded him with favours and presents. Cleomenes now returned to Egina, accompanied by Leotychides. The Æginetans did not dare to oppose any resistance to their joint demand, and surrendered to them ten of their leading citizens, whom Cleomenes deposited as hostages in the hands of the Athenians. § 3. Meanwhile Darius had completed his preparations for the invasion of Greece. In the spring of B.C. 490, a vast army was assembled in Cilicia, and a fleet of 600 galleys, together with many transports for horses, was ready to receive them on board. The command was given to Datis, a Median, and Artaphernes, son of the satrap of Sardis of that name, and a nephew of Darius. Their instructions were generally to reduce to subjection all the Greek cities, which had not already given earth and water; but more particularly to burn to the ground the cities of Athens and Eretria, and to carry away the inhabitants as slaves. They were furnished with fetters for binding the Grecian prisoners; and before the end of the year Darius fully expected to see at his feet the men who had dared to burn the city of Sardis. The possibility of failure probably never occurred either to the king himself, or to any of the soldiers engaged in the expedition. Having taken their men on board, Datis and Artaphernes first sailed to Samos; and, warned by the recent disaster of Mardonius in doubling the promontory of Mount Athos, they resolved to sail straight across the Ægean to Eubœa, subduing on their way the Cyclades. They first resolved to attack Naxos, which ten years before had gallantly repelled a large Persian force commanded by Megabates and Aristagoras of Miletus. But the Naxians did not now even venture to wait the arrival of the Persians, but fled to the mountains, abandoning their town to the invaders, who burnt it to the ground. The other islands of the Cyclades yielded a ready submission; and it was not till Datis reached Euboea that he encountered any resistance. Eretria defended itself gallantly for six days, and repulsed the Persians with loss; but on the seventh the gates were opened to the besiegers by the treachery of two of its leading citizens. The city was razed to the ground, and the inhabitants were put in chains, according to the command of the Persian monarch. Datis had thus easily accomplished one of the two great objects for which he had been sent into Greece. He now proceeded to execute his second order. After remaining a few days at Eretria, he crossed over to Attica, and landed on the ever memorable plain of Marathon, a spot which had been pointed out to him by the despot Hippias, who accompanied the Persian army. § 4. It is now time to turn to Athens, and see what preparations had there been made to meet the threatening danger. While the Persian army was on its passage across the Egean, ten generals had been elected for the year, according to the regular custom, one for each tribe. Among these generals were three men, whose names have acquired immortal fame,-Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides. Of the two latter we shall have occasion to speak more fully presently; but Miltiades claims our immediate attention. Miltiades had been the despot of the Chersonesus, whither he had been sent from Athens by Hippias about the year 516 B.C., to take possession of the inheritance of his uncle, who bore the same name. As ruler of the Chersonesus, he had distinguished himself by his bravery and decision of character. We have already seen that he accompanied Darius in his invasion of Scythia, and recommended the Ionian despots to break down the bridge of boats across the Danube and leave Darius to his fate. While the Persian generals were engaged in suppressing the Ionic revolt, he took possession of Lemnos and Imbros, expelled the Persian garrisons and Pelasgian inhabitants, and handed over these islands to the Athenians. He had thus committed two great offences against the Persian monarch; and accordingly when the Phoenician fleet appeared in the Hellespont after the extinction of the Ionic revolt, he sought safety in flight, and hastily sailed away to Athens with a small squadron of five ships. He was hotly pursued by the Phoenicians, who were most eager to secure his person as an acceptable offering to Darius. They succeeded in taking one of his ships, commanded by his son Metiochus, but Miltiades himself reached Athens in safety. Soon after his arrival, he was brought to trial on account of his despotism in the Chersonesus. Not only was he honourably acquitted at the time, probably on account of the recent service he had rendered to Athens by the conquest of Lemnos and Imbros, but such confidence did his abilities inspire, that he was elected one of the ten generals of the republic on the approach of the Persian fleet. § 5. As soon as the news of the fall of Eretria reached Athens, the courier Phidippides was sent to Sparta to solicit assistance. Such was his extraordinary speed of foot that he performed this journey of 150 miles in 48 hours. The Spartans promised their aid; but their superstition rendered their promise ineffectual, since it wanted a few days to the full moon, and it was contrary to their religious customs to commence a march during this interval. The reason given by the Spartans for their delay does not appear to have been a pretext; and this instance is only one among many of that blind attachment to ancient forms which characterize this people throughout the whole period of their history. Meantime, the Athenians had marched to Marathon, and were encamped upon the mountains which surrounded the plain. Upon learning the answer which Phidippides brought from Sparta, the ten generals were divided in opinion as to the best course to be pursued. Five of them were opposed to an immediate engagement with the overwhelming number of Persians, and urged the importance of waiting for the arrival of the Lacedæmonian succours. Miltiades and the remaining four contended, on the other hand, that not a moment should be lost in fighting the Persians, not only in order to avail themselves of the present enthusiasm of the people, but still more to prevent treachery from spreading among their ranks, and paralyzing all united effort. The momentous decision, upon which the destinies of Athens, and indeed of all Greece hung, depended upon the casting-vote of Callimachus, the Polemarch; for down to this time the third Archon was a colleague of the ten generals.* To him Miltiades now addressed himself with the utmost earnestness, pointing out the danger of delay, and that only a speedy and decisive victory could save them from the treacherous attempts * See above, p. 91. |